Unlearning and Seyab's theorem: a dialogue about updating probability by Mana, P. G. L. Porta
 Unlearning and Seyab’s theorem 
a dialogue about updating probability 
P.G.L. PortaMana <mana kth.se> 
8 October 2018 
“You can never know everything,” Lan said quietly, “and 
part of what you know is always wrong. Perhaps even the 
most important part. A portion of wisdom lies in knowing 
that. A portion of courage lies in going on anyway.” 
(Jordan 2010) 
The interlocutors Salviati and Simplicio are two students very passionate about 
the probability calculus, logic, and philosophy. 
Salv. It’s beautifully simple how Bayes’s theorem, 
P ( B | A ∧ I )  P ( A | B ∧ I ) P ( B | I )P ( A | I ) (1) 
relates the probabilities we give to a proposition B in the two cases: when 
we know only I , and when we also know A besides I . Isn’t it, Simplicio? 
Simp. It surely is, Salviati. Don’t forget that the theorem requires you 
to specify either P ( A | B ∧ I ) and P ( A ∧ I ) , or P ( A ∧ B | I ) and P ( A | ¬ B ∧ I ) , 
or some similar combination, to get the latter of the two probabilities you 
mention from the former. 
Salv. Of course. And as you just said, we usually calculate P ( B | A ∧ I ) 
given P ( B | I ) , don’t we? 
Simp. Yes, that’s quite natural, because the theorem tells us how to 
update our probability about B when we learn A . That’s why we call 
P ( B | A ∧ I ) the posterior probability and P ( B | I ) the prior probability. 
Salv. You see, I was thinking about something curious connected with 
this prior and posterior business. In our lives we often learn new things and 
acquire new knowledge. But at times we also unlearn, forget, lose data, or 
discover that some of our knowledge is unfounded. Don’t we? 
Simp. Absolutely! Something like that happened to me recently. Do you 
remember what they told us in our classes in quantum mechanics – that if 
you prepare a particle with a very precise position, then a measurement 
of its momentum will give a completely uncertain result? 
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Salv. I remember. Of course, position and momentum are conjugate 
quantities. 
Simp. Well, what our teachers said isn’t really true. It turns out that if 
you make one measurement of the momentum of that particle, you can get 
a definite result, as precise as you like. 
Salv. Heresy! 
Simp. It’s true and actually very sensible. Consider a simpler case: you 
prepare an electron with spin in the positive x direction, say, and then 
make one measurement of its spin in the y direction. The result of the 
measurement is one definite spot on the screen at the exit of the measuring 
Stern-Gerlach apparatus (Peres 1995 fig. 1.5, § 1-5, p. 14): we know precisely 
the result, either + ℏ / 2 or − ℏ / 2 in the y direction. Yet the measurement 
error, according to the standard formulae, is ℏ / 2 . 
Salv. That sounds true. But then how do you reconcile this with the 
formulae? Were our teachers lying? 
Simp. The point is that the formulae refer to the statistics of many 
measurements, not just one. If you repeat the spin measurement with the 
same experimental setup, you’ll observe a new and precise result, either 
+ ℏ / 2 or − ℏ / 2 . As you repeat this kind of experiment, both results will be 
observed in about a fifty-fifty ratio. The “measurement error” refers to the 
standard deviation in many measurements. The situation with position 
and momentum is analogous. Our teachers were not lying but using a 
too vague or slightly wrong terminology about what the “measurement 
error” was. Read Ballentine (1970), or take a look at the experimental 
results in Leonhardt (1997) – e.g. his fig. 2.1, § 2.2, p. 23 – to have a better 
understanding of the situation. No paradoxes. 
Salv. Amazing, it looks like I have also unlearnt something today. 
Simp. As you said, it happens. But how does this relate to Bayes’s 
theorem? 
Salv. Right. You see, I was thinking about the three rules of the 
probability calculus, 
P (¬ A | I )  1 − P ( A | I ) , P ( B ∧ A | I )  P ( B | A ∧ I ) P ( A | I ) , 
P ( A ∨ B | I )  P ( B | I ) + P ( A | I ) − P ( B ∧ A | I ) . (2) 
These rules, combined, give us relations among probabilities with different 
conditionals. By the way, do you mind if I use the term context to refer to 
the conditional? 
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Simp. It isn’t standard terminology I think, but it sounds like a sensible 
term. Maybe you could even use situation , similarly to Barwise’s (1989) no- 
tion in Logic; I’ve been wondering for a long time whether Barwise’s notion 
of situation in Logic has deeper connections with probability conditionals. 
But that’s a discussion topic for another time. Please go on. 
Salv. Thank you. Bayes’s theorem is an example of what I was saying 
about relations between contexts: it relates the probabilities for B in the 
context where we know I and in the context where we know A ∧ I . Now 
here’s my point: the probability rules tell us nothing about which of these 
two contexts comes first in time; they don’t say which should be prior and 
which posterior . Now imagine a situation in which we have knowledge of 
A ∧ I , but some time later we forget whether A is true. Then P ( B | A ∧ I ) 
would be our prior probability, and P ( B | I ) our posterior . 
Simp. Mmm. . . In that case wouldn’t we also forget the numerical 
value of P ( B | A ∧ I ) ? Or, if we have saved the value of this probability 
somewhere, it would remind us that we knew A was true, so we should 
still need to consider P ( B | A ∧ I ) , shouldn’t we? 
Salv. Right, my example wasn’t very logical. Consider this then: we 
are initially sure about A , besides I , so we use probabilities with the 
context A ∧ I . But then we somehow discover that A isn’t actually certain; 
our certainty was unfounded. Upon this discovery we should start using 
probabilities with context I only. Our probability for B should be updated 
in reverse, using “Seyab’s theorem”: 
P ( B | I )  P ( A | I ) P ( B | A ∧ I )P ( A | B ∧ I ) , (3) 
which expresses our unlearning of A . The probability P ( B | A ∧ I ) is 
our prior , and P ( B | I ) our posterior . The probability P ( A | I ) appears as a 
normalization factor just like in Bayes’s theorem. 
Simp. I feel that there’s an inconsistency in your example. If the context 
I doesn’t give an extremal, 0 or 1 probability to A , then that context does 
not contradict the possibility that A might be true. So in that context 
there’s the possibility that we discover later that A is true, and therefore 
move A into the context. But once A enters the context, and we use the 
new context A ∧ I , the possibility that A might be uncertain contradicts 
this new context. Hence we can’t revert to using I alone. 
Salv. Yours is an interesting assertion. You seem to be invoking an 
additional rule on how to use the three probability rules. Do the three 
rules (2) say that you can’t take a proposition out of a context, once you’re 
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using that context for your plausibility judgements? Where or how do the 
rules exactly say this? 
Simp. Well, the probability rules don’t prescribe which context we 
should be using, for that matter. I think it’s implicit in their use that the 
context of probability judgement should reflect our state of knowledge or 
whatever working hypotheses we’re entertaining. Just like in truth logic 
we use axioms that express what we know, when we want to reason out a 
conclusion deductively. 
Salv. I agree with the point of view you just expressed. But I think it 
endorses what I was saying: if we are initially sure about A and I , then 
we should use the context A ∧ I ; if we later become uncertain about A , 
then we should switch to the context I . I thought you agreed with me that 
in real life we can happen to become unsure about something we were 
previously sure of. 
Simp. Your reasoning appears formally correct, but I still can’t shake 
off the feeling that it contains a contradiction. OK, Let me change my 
argument a little. I think that we shouldn’t have used the context A ∧ I 
in the first place. You say: “we’re initially certain about A ”; but I rather 
imagine that we initially didn’t know A directly: we had some other kind 
of knowledge instead, say expressed by the proposition O , that gave almost 
unit probability to A : 
P ( A | O ∧ I )  1 − ϵ , ϵ ≪ 1 , (4) 
and, by the probability rules, 
P ( B | O ∧ I )  P ( B | A ∧ O ∧ I ) P ( A | O ∧ I ) + 
P ( B | ¬ A ∧ O ∧ I ) P (¬ A | O ∧ I ) , 
≈ P ( B | A ∧ O ∧ I ) . 
(5) 
So O ∧ I , not A ∧ I , was our initial context, leading to probability judgements 
very similar to assuming A to be true. When you say “we discover that A 
is uncertain”, I imagine that we learn some new fact, say expressed by O ′, 
that makes A again very uncertain, even nullifying our knowledge of O : 
P ( A | O ′ ∧ O ∧ I )  P ( A | I ) , (6) 
and in this new context, O ′ ∧ O ∧ I , our probability judgement for B is 
numerically very close to P ( B | I ) . I think this analysis gives numerical 
values similar to yours, but is closer to what would happen in a real 
situation of “unlearning”. 
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Salv. Your analysis is absolutely valid and can be an accurate repres- 
entation of many a real situation. But I think that it lends a hand to my 
own argument. First, I can still imagine a situation in which we become 
unsure about O , the proposition that you assumed to be certain. In this 
case I suppose we could make an analysis similar to the one you just made, 
but with O in place of A , introducing some new proposition N relating to 
O as O related to A . But this game could go on forever. 
Simp. You seem to be saying that indubitable, certain knowledge is 
impossible to acquire. I completely disagree with such philosophical 
position. 
Salv. That wasn’t my intention. My point is to show that your analysis 
doesn’t deny the possibility that we might become unsure about something 
we were sure of. Your analysis doesn’t show any contradiction in my 
position; it only sidesteps it. 
Simp. That’s true. I feel the need to sidestep it because, to me, saying that 
A is certain seems to exclude the possibility that we can become uncertain 
about it. Doesn’t this possibility contradict the notion of “certainty” itself? 
wouldn’t it mean that we were not completely certain about A in the first 
place? 
Salv. That’s an important philosophical and semantic question. I partly 
understand what you mean. And yet I’m not convinced that being sure 
about something at some time contradicts being unsure about it some 
time later. In any case, what’s important is that the probability rules make 
allowance for this possibility; don’t they? Seyab’s theorem, derived from 
them, seems to suggest exactly this possibility. 
Simp. I agree, I don’t have a philosophical proof of my view about 
“certainty”. To be honest I’m not acquainted with any philosophical works 
about this concept. I was just giving voice to my common sense; but it 
seems yours is at variance with mine. My analysis shows that we can make 
sense of your “unlearning”, though, by adding more propositions to the 
context rather than by deleting them. 
Salv. The numerical probability values of your analysis are practically 
identical with the ones we would obtain with Seyab’s theorem (3) . Or at 
least, your analysis doesn’t show that direct application of Seyab’s theorem 
would lead to inconsistent values. So why can’t we just apply it? Why can’t 
we simply move A out of the context? 
Simp. With some more thinking I might find a contradiction in your 
view. But for the moment let me ask you a different question: in which 
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situations could your Seyab theorem be used? Do you have any concrete 
applications in mind? 
Salv. No, I don’t. As I said, it was a curiosity and prompted my 
question about updating contexts. But we live in an age when knowledge 
and information are stored at a rate never experienced before. For this 
reason, loss and deterioration of knowledge and information become more 
likely, too. The outcome of a laboratory experiment could be misrecorded, 
the results of a medical test could be lost, a meteorological report could be 
misinterpreted. Couldn’t Seyab’s theorem turn out to be useful in such 
cases? 
Simp. I don’t think it likely, but as a scientist I’ll give you the benefit of 
doubt of course. We never know. 
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